The relocation of the wool market from London to the major Australian port cities from the late nineteenth century required the formation of an institution to govern the auction business, namely the wool brokers' association. Regional variations, among Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, occurred in the structure and effectiveness of the institution despite each regional association having been formed around the same time, for the same purpose, and with an overlap of participating firms. We draw on institution theory to guide our account and find that the impact of legacy factors and differences in market conditions explain the regional variations. 
INTRODUCTION
The global supply chain in the world's woollen textile industry underwent two significant changes in the second half of the nineteenth century. Raw wool came increasingly from the southern hemisphere where Australia emerged as the world's foremost producer of apparel wool. Then between 1890 and 1910 the point of sale for most Australian wool shifted from London to auctions conducted across the main Australian port cities prior to export. Our study concerns the critical role of a new regionally-based institution, the wool brokers' association, in this process.
A critical element has been overlooked in earlier explanations of the transfer of the wool market to Australian cities 1 , the creation of an effective institutional framework to support the marketing of wool. This paper focuses on the three principal auction markets, of Sydney,
Melbourne and Brisbane, which sold more than 70 per cent of Australia's wool from the early 'nineties until 1909. 2 Within each selling centre a number of firms, which simultaneously had competed to provide other types of services to wool growers, now formed associations in the 1890s whose objectives were to conduct sales through a single auction room, to charge a common fee, and to restrict non-price competition for custom. 3 A study of these events permits us to observe the creation of an industry-specific institution, the woolbrokers' association, at roughly the same time but in different geographic settings. Rich archival records enable us to explore the motivation for the establishment of the associations and to observe the interplay between the resulting organisations and their members. We discover variations in this institution and its effectiveness from city to city. We argue that participation in, and commitment to, each of the three institutional forms was dependent on localized external forces. The study is further nuanced, as each regional institution responded to the structure and performance of the others. Over time, the nature of coordination between them became as pressing as the need for coordination within each one. Our story ends in 1909 when the association in Sydney, which had collapsed in 1900, resumes and as the three associations begin discussions to establish a national body, a feat accomplished in 1918 with The paper begins by arguing that the growth of sales in the local wool market was contingent on having an effective institutional framework. We then draw on an element of institution theory 5 to argue that the wool brokers' associations were a form of institution, and one situated towards the regulatory end of a regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive continuum as described by Scott. 6 Insights from institution theory frame the questions driving the paper, sharpen our thinking about concepts, and offer prompts about how we interpret our data.
In the third section of the paper we use the archival records of the three associations to track their emergence and evolution. We find that all were initially designed as regulatory institutions that sought to garner cooperative behaviour among rival firms through a formal set of rules with extensive monitoring mechanisms and punishments for non-compliance.
However, each adopted different sets of rules. We show how differences in the constitutional framework of each association reveal the extent of the struggle to achieve compliance and cooperation. Moreover, we find marked dissimilarities in these outcomes between associations. Cooperative impulses were far stronger in Melbourne and Brisbane than in Sydney where that association proved less effective in constraining the behaviour of member firms.
The fourth section explores the reasons for the divergence in institutional form and the wide gap in its effectiveness between cities. We shift focus to the challenges facing firms operating within each of the three market places. The structure of the local 'industries', particularly the number and type of participating firms, and the supply of wool available for sale play a key part in our explanation of the differences.
We conclude by observing that both weak and strong institutional forms were capable of underpinning the operation of the central auction system. A coordinated series of wool sales operated in Sydney despite low levels of trust between association members throughout the 1890s and throughout the Association's period of inactivity after 1900. Moreover, the Sydney wool sales were increasingly coordinated with those in Melbourne and Brisbane. We return to the institution theory literature to provide an explanation of this phenomenon.
REQUIRING A NEW INSTITUTION
Prior to the creation of a central auction system in the early 1890s, Australian wool had reached world markets in a variety of ways. For the most part, local stock and station agents and banks provided consignment services to grower clients. At the margin, some firms acted as merchants buying wool directly from growers and/or at auction in Sydney and Melbourne. 7 An initially fragmented Australian auction system was not an effective substitute in the eyes of foreign buyers to the dominant practice of consignment to auction in London up to the 1880s for a number of reasons. Buyers coming to Australia faced higher costs in collecting information about multiple auction service providers, each with small offerings, who ran conflicting sales schedules, operated with different levels of charges, had idiosyncratic sampling procedures, and who had non-standard sales contracts and arbitration procedures.
Buyers also faced high costs in ascertaining the quality and yield of wool, as poor classing in many shearing sheds and unscrupulous behaviour by some growers compromised their ability to ascertain the quality and weight of wool purchased.
These problems were gradually resolved by the establishment of a central auction system which coordinated and standardized the auction services provided by firms operating in Australia's major ports. It also offered high payoffs to broking firms because wool marketing had high fixed costs in terms of warehouse assets. Collective action, if successful, would attract more buyers and allow the realization of economies of scale in conducting the auction such as a shared salesroom, sale catalogue, and promotional costs. Moreover, participating firms could exploit their collective market power by raising prices and limiting non-price competition to create rents.
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The sale of wool shifted from London to Australia after the establishment of a central auction system with three-quarters of exports having been sold locally in the first decade of the 7 Barnard, Australian Wool Market, Ville, Rural Entrepreneurs associations about the conduct of the auction system, including the movement of wool into and out of the stores, the weighing and sampling of bales before auction, the terms of payment and dispute resolution all of which reduced uncertainty.
The central auction system in each of the port cities was therefore organized by wool selling brokers' associations. These bodies were registered as organizations under extant company law. However, in purpose and form they were a type of institution. They were designed as vehicles for co-ordination amongst firms who anticipated that participation would bring greater financial rewards than operating independently. These associations were not purposive wealth maximizing organizations in their own right. They were cost centres. The associations did not collect the revenue streams associated with wool selling. Contracts were signed between the growers and the brokers, and the buyers and the brokers, payment was made by clients to the individual broking firms not to the association. Associations had limited physical resources, initially renting an auction room, and their operation relied on the services of a secretary and a handful of members of the participating broking firms serving in a part-time and honorary capacity. They were accompanied by the emergence of associational behaviour among both growers and buyers with the consequence that much of the communication and many of the decisions about the development of the wool market were taken amongst a web of interacting associations. weighing, cataloguing and so on, and the presence of physical artefacts such as the auction room and wool stores, reinforce adherence and compliance to the aims of the institution.
Time matters because it facilitates experimentation and adaptation. We will argue below that the differences between the formal constitutional governance of the institutions between cities, and the breakdown of the formal association in Sydney, mattered less than it might have because of the evolution of multiple pillars, a subtle shift towards normative and cultural-cognitive pillars, and the evolution of standardized custom and practice within and between associations.
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INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 13 Scott, Institutions and Organizations, and station agents, many of whom became wool brokers, had previously developed cooperative arrangements concerning auctions among local pastoralists of other farm produce and livestock, the latter involving sharing common facilities such as sale yards and coordinated sale rosters and the setting of uniform fees. In general, the associations included all of the major wool brokers although sometimes a cooperative operated independently. We will also see that several Sydney brokers temporarily resigned their membership as cooperation eroded for a while at that centre.
These leading stock and station agents were the institutional entrepreneurs who recognised were frequently revised and expanded over the next 20 years in a response to the perceived need to constrain the behaviours of their members and to deal with the greater complexity of the processes involved in marketing wool. Table 1 around here   Table 1 is an attempt to capture the formal nature of the institutions in 1909 and to show in which respects they diverged. Their constitutions set out a governance structure that defined the obligations, rights and privileges of members. These were inclusive in that all member firms were part of the committee which, in the words of the Brisbane Association, had 'absolute control' over the 'entire management of the Association and of all its affairs' 22 .
However, the number of votes granted to each member ranged from one each in Melbourne to multiple votes related to the sale of wool in the two northern centres, thus giving the larger firms in those markets more weight. However, on delicate matters such as fining or expelling members, all reverted to one firm, one vote. In both Melbourne and Brisbane, the chair was elected from among members at the Annual General Meeting. Sydney stood apart, placing itself in the hands of an independent outsider with extraordinary powers to investigate and punish breaches of the rules. Both Sydney and Brisbane felt it necessary to bribe members to attend committee meetings, or fine those coming late, whereas Melbourne did not.
The rules of all three associations bound their members to agreement on the nature of the work to be carried out in preparing wool for sale and delivery to the buyers, and the fees and charges determined by the association. There were minor variations in the rules regarding warehouse procedures, most of which were driven by buyers' requirements for the numbers of bales to be sampled for cross-bred and merino wools. However, pricing structures differed between centres and within centres over time. From their inception, Melbourne and Brisbane used a two-step 'receiving fee' linked to the volume of wool handled and a tiered sales commission, while Sydney switched backwards and forwards between that and a single composite fee linked to the value of wool sold. Member firms also agreed not to engage in non-price competition. Three activities were contentious: firms had offered 'rebates' to local agents to direct wool into their stores; travellers were employed to canvas business directly from growers; and firms advertised via a variety of media such as press notices of sales results, gifts and prizes at local shows.
Achieving agreement on prices and mitigating non-price competition was more easily achieved in some centres than others. Each association had a process that facilitated 22 BWSBA OMA/1767/1, Rules, Clause 11, 18 October 1898, JOL.
monitoring of the behaviour of member firms. Firms could bring accusations of a breach of the rules, such as undercutting the Association's rates or individual advertising, to the committee by lodging a complaint with the honorary secretary. The accused could defend itself against the charge and the committee would arbitrate. If it was found guilty, the miscreant would be fined, or expelled from the association. The latter was a credible threat as the firm would forfeit its joining 'contribution' of up to £500 and not be allowed access to the auction room. The impulse to bring an action was tempered by the need to post a small bond, usually £5, which would be forfeited if the accused was found innocent. The procedures by which the claims of the accuser and those accused were investigated varied significantly between centres. Sydney was the outlier. Once a serious breach had been established, the matter passed to the 'arbitrator' for adjudication. The arbitrator had the power to call witnesses and to examine the documents of the defendant. Brisbane moved some way down the same path by being able to employ the services of an external accountant to examine more complex cases. The paradox is that the Sydney constitution anticipated this type of behaviour, the result of low trust and wavering commitment by members, through its heavy handed rules. We suggest that these arrangements reflected a continuing lack of trust between the founding firms in the 1890s and amongst the enlarged group of firms operating in the 1900s. There may have been doubts about the impartiality of any elected chair and the possibility of fears that firms might form coalitions to lock in key positions in the Association to the detriment of others. When the Association was re-formed in 1909, the role of Arbitrator was extended from being the chair of the association to chairing all meetings of the committee, although he could delegate 23 
WHY DID INSTITUTIONS DIFFER?
As shown in Table 2 Table 1 shows that the constitutions had much in common. However, the lack of trust between members in Sydney is reflected in the two outstanding differences between it and the associations in Melbourne and Brisbane, the adoption of an independent chair and a fixed time period. Even where rules converged over time as a result of conferences attended by all the associations, practice continued to differ. We will argue that localized factors generated differential levels of trust at the time of association formation and rule framing, and that these perceptions became embedded as a form of path dependency. Institutional theorists are divided about the longevity of institutional structures 26 . Our study suggests that the character of the institutions adapted to changing circumstances in what is from an historian's perspective quite a short time frame. Moreover, the process of adaption was multi-faceted.
While the formal rules of each of the three associations were revised periodically some significant differences remained. However, the willingness to cooperate was enhanced by the strengthening of the normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of the pillars supporting the institution. Convergence occurred more rapidly on these latter two dimensions than on the formal rules. Following the reasoning of economists and economic historians, we argue that the level of commitment by wool brokers to the formal rules of an association, and an acceptance of high levels of coercion to enforce conformity, depended on their calculations of the resultant pay offs. 27 Being a member of an association offered two benefits: a greater number of sellers and buyers participating in a centralised auction; and the ability to collude at the expense of growers and buyers. The potential size of these benefits and the ability to realize them depended on the extent to which other brokers became members. The more universal the membership, the greater the likely benefit of being a member and vice versa. Moreover, brokers could continue to act as members of the association to receive one rather than both of the benefits, to seek increased throughput in the wool store or to seek higher margins by raising fees and limiting non-price competition. In either circumstance, some brokers might decide that their interests were best served by 'cheating' the association. They would weigh the likely benefits arising from gaining greater market share by breaking the rules against the costs of being punished. Brokers' decisions to so act would be influenced by the likelihood of being caught, an outcome which would depend upon the resources that the association devoted to monitoring its members' actions. Melbourne had lost the title of the 'principal wool mart of Australia' to Sydney in the 1880s:
sheep numbers in the colony grew rapidly, more firms were willing to trade wool, and 34 There were two possible drivers of such a shift. First, strong prior relationships with wool growers possessed by those stock and station agents and financiers entering the broking industry could leach share from incumbents. 35 Ties between the big pastoral lenders and those in their debt were particularly powerful. Second, the impact of the long drought was uneven across and within the colonies. 36 The supply of wool coming forward by the incumbents' clients was determined by the caprice of nature. However, GM's internal correspondence shows it believed that the loss of custom was directly attributable to breaking of the rules by other members of the Association. In late 1893 the Sydney manager urged his superiors to permit him to secede which they eventually did in late December. Thereafter, GM set prices independently, arguing that 'we must be allowed to conduct our internal business as suited our conditions'. 37 We observe different responses to shifts in market share in the other centres. In Melbourne, subsidies, relief from export taxes, and reductions in railway freights. 51 The members of the renamed association, the Brisbane Wool Selling Brokers' Association, shared premises in which their wool was stored and viewed by the buyers before auction. An annexe of the government's Exhibition Building was used for the purpose for many years. The Association negotiated hard with its landlord winning numerous improvements to the site including, better lighting, wider doors to facilitate the movement of bales in and out, and the construction of a rail siding. 52 The small number of members meant that there was greater involvement in the planning and operation of the market than happened in Sydney or
Melbourne where participants built their own wool stores.
PAYOFFS
Brokers operated in an environment of considerable uncertainty about the future of the industry, which clouded the estimation of pay offs. It was far from certain in the 1890s that In an environment with high levels of uncertainty about the future of wool broking and with firms making various degrees of commitment to this side of their business we might anticipate that firms, particularly those with pessimistic expectations, would take a short-term view of the pay offs. The uncertainty was augmented by Sydney having a larger number of brokers there than in either Melbourne or Brisbane, with a past history of non-cooperation, who scrambled for market share. Game theory suggests there is a heightened tendency for players to 'cheat' in what they expect to be the last round of the game as they can escape retaliation. 58 Consequently, Sydney firms would be more likely to 'cheat' than in Melbourne or Brisbane because they anticipated withdrawing from wool broking and/or that the Association would collapse so removing the opportunity to 'cheat' against the agreed charges and arrangements relating to non-price competition.
Sydney-based broking firms discriminated between pay-offs involved from operating a central sale room and from agreements about rents. Payoffs from the operation of a central auction room arose from the increased volume of wool handled in an industry with high fixed costs. While firms 'cheated' on price to such an extent that the formal Association fell into abeyance, the bargains relating to the auction system continued to be honoured in full.
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Members continued to operate as a shadow organization by achieving coordination in conducting regular auctions in Sydney, negotiating with buyers' associations, and integrating its sale calendar with those of Brisbane and Melbourne. While Sydney firms were prepared to strike out on their own with regard to price, none attempted to operate independently in selling wool. We would suggest that the impulse to cooperate comes from a calculation of the benefits arising from participating in the central auction system and of the costs of operating 56 For instance, the BWSBA advertised in local newspapers highlighting the government bonus of £1 per ton of wool sold at the Brisbane auctions. The Sydney Association placed greater reliance on coercive mechanisms to bond its members yet it was weakened by endemic 'cheating'. We argued above that brokers operating in Sydney through the 1890s and early 1900s faced the greatest amount of uncertainty about the future of this emergent industry and the greatest environmental stress. In this atmosphere, many firms calculated that the pursuit of self-interest favoured independent action with respect to issues of pricing their services and to attracting wool into their stores by using travellers and advertising to attract custom. In the end, the individualistic behaviour had cost everyone dear as margins were competed away. Discussion of the draft allowance given to buyers dragged on without resolution, prompting the sarcastic comment that 'the discussion, or rather altercation, on this subject would have been prolonged indefinitely if time had allowed.
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For all the residual tensions and bickering mentioned above, the day to day operation of a central auction room in Sydney strengthened the institution over time. The rules and regulations adopted by the Association at the time of its reformation in 1909 were still tougher than those governing the associations in Melbourne and Brisbane. In our view, the growing levels of trust between wool brokers in Sydney mattered more in strengthening that institution than a reframing of the constitution. Individuals representing firms were drawn into regular face to face contact participating in the annual series of wool sales over the previous 17 years. Many of the managers representing firms in the three selling centres held those posts for decades. 63 Moreover, members of the Associations regularly travelled 600 miles together by train and ship to attend conferences with brokers in other cities. Friendships were formed and common interests identified that created a pool of social capital that salved remaining frictions. 64 Changes in behaviour among Sydney brokers was driven by a combination of internal and external pressures. Years of intense competition to protect or gain market share at the expense of their colleagues had driven margins to near competitive levels. Sydney brokers had the example of members of associations in Melbourne and Brisbane generating and enjoying rents. 65 The pay offs from coordination could be increased by co-operation.
Moreover, the associations in other markets were growing concerned that the lower level of charges levied on both growers and particularly buyers in Sydney were used as a bargaining chip to reduce them elsewhere. 66 Coordination between associations became an imperative to protect the rents being earned by wool brokers across Australia. Over time a number of the major wool brokers were engaged in multiple selling centres. By so doing each gained firsthand experience of the differences in rents being earned at various locations, and this information possibly stimulated the reconstitution of the Sydney Association in 1909.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have employed the three pillars schema to explore the forces which shaped the establishment and evolution of the institution governing the wool auction system. In doing so, we offer some fresh insights into the institution theory literature. Each of the pillars draws on a distinct social science discipline. Economists and economic historians rely upon the regulatory interpretation, sociologists employ the normative pillar, and cultural anthropologists work within the cultural-cognitive pillar. 67 Researchers from each discipline might be expected to approach the problem through their own lens. The literature offers few clues as to how the pillars may work together or how their inter-relationship alters over time.
Our study, contextualized by an institution to serve a particular purpose and located in a unique time and location, provides an illustration of how the game plays out. The wool brokers' associations are best understood initially through the use of a regulatory pillar framework. This study of a micro-institution concerns the actions of business people undertaking high stakes investment in a central wool auction. The participants were known to one another through prior dealings, some collaborative such as conducting live stock auctions, while others were competitive, particularly mortgage lending. However, these interactions were unlikely to have had sufficient breadth or time to build strong normative or cultural-cognitive pillars. The participants were predisposed to codify agreements. Local
Chambers of Commerce had long been arbiters of commercial practice. Business was conducted in a country using British commercial law that facilitated contract enforcement.
Paradoxically, the strength of a market-based regulatory system gave the participants within the wool brokers' association greater scope for agency. The wider 'rules of the game' as defined by North 68 encouraged firms to follow their own path confident that their private rights were secure within the scope of the law. Consequently, the broader rules of the game legitimized defection from associational agreements as the pursuit of self interest was permissible. Firms made rational calculations about the benefits and costs from abiding by the rules or cheating. We suggest that localized environmental forces shaped how wool broking firms acted. The severe drought and falling wool prices hit the firms operating in the Sydney market harder than those in Melbourne and Brisbane. Uncertainty was greater amongst Sydney firms because there were more competitors operating there. In these circumstances, many of the Sydney firms felt that their best choice was to cheat on industry agreements with respect to receiving and delivery charges, sales commissions, and non-price competition.
We have argued above that the increasing strength of the institution in Sydney relied on more than a regulatory pillar. Indeed, that pillar was ineffective as 'cheating' was rampant and punishment almost non-existent. Despite this, the Association persisted with much the same form of a highly legalistic and draconian monitoring system in its rules upon re-forming in and stud masters were national identities. 69 The great pastoral companies were national leaders. 70 Being seen as part of the wool industry gave legitimacy to the firms involved.
These developments nourished yet another pillar, the cultural-cognitive.
The rise of normative and cultural-cognitive pillars notwithstanding, the re-formation of the Sydney association relied heavily on the rational calculus of its members. Fierce competition within Sydney for market share had driven profits down. Sydney brokers were aware that members of the Melbourne and Brisbane associations were generating higher margins as a result of their agreements. This knowledge was transmitted to them by Sydney firms which also operated in the other markets. Eventually, Sydney brokers accepted the same levels of prices and restrictions on non-price competition as in the other centres and abided by them.
Sydney brokers recognized that they needed to reform their association to interact with the buyers and the other associations. The transfer from consignment to local auction was largely complete. The growth of a mass market required coordination on a national scale. Sydney, the largest market, could not afford to remain aloof. The wheel had turned full circle as 
